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inian fashion, a useful set of reminders, reflections, musings, and questions 
about what it is to 'leave everything as it is.' Exploring the senses in which 
photography, for example, leaves everything as it is, and provocatively asking 
whether theology leaves everything as it is, Bambrough makes us think again 
about the philosophical status of 'description' and the ways in which philo-
sophical accounts can contour religious responses. 
Anthologies are particularly frustrating objects for review, for one can 
never even begin to do justice to the individual essays. Acknowledging that, 
let me commend this collection for its richness: it addresses a perennial 
question with remarkable detail across a wide historical range, and the pages 
are full of intriguing suggestions; it is frustrating only in its great diversity, 
not in its quality. 
Evil Revisited: Responses and Reconsiderations, by David Ray Griffin. 
Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1991. Pp. xiv and 277. 
DAVID BASINGER, Roberts Wesleyan College. 
In 1976, David Griffin published God, Freedom, and Evil, a book in which 
he argued that the solution to the problem of evil proposed by process theism 
is superior to those solutions available within traditional (classical) theism. 
Evil Revisited consists largely of responses to critiques of his earlier book. 
But it is not simply a collection of independent counter-responses to specific 
criticisms. It is a coherent, self-contained restatement of Griffin's belief that 
only process theists can offer an adequate theistic response to the scope and 
intensity of the evil we encounter. 
Griffin begins by outlining the three theodicies with which the book is 
concerned. Proponents of traditional all-determining theism, we are told, 
believe that "God in fact totally determines every event, including all human 
decisions and actions, and therefore all 'sinful' acts" (p. 13). And thus, to 
preserve God's goodness, they must ultimately deny that there is any genuine 
evil-any evil that is not necessary for bringing about some greater good or 
avoiding some greater evil-and acknowledge instead that each instance of 
evil is a necessary component in God's perfect creative plan. 
Proponents of traditional free-will theism, Griffin continues, agree with 
proponents of traditional all-determining theism that "God essentially has all 
the power in the universe" (p. 14). They agree, for instance, that God could 
unilaterally have created a world with no genuine evil. But free-will theists 
also hold that "God has voluntarily delegated power to creatures" (p. 14). 
Specifically, they hold that God has given us significant freedom-the free-
dom to bring about good or evil-because he desires that we develop "moral 
and spiritual qualities through free decisions" and "because pain and suffering 
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are essential conditions to the realization of many of the most important moral 
and spiritual qualities" (p. 15). And, accordingly, they believe that they can 
maintain justifiably both that genuine evil exists and that God is perfectly 
good. 
Finally, proponents of process theism, Griffin points out, agree with pro-
ponents of traditional free-will theism that humans possess significant free-
dom and thus that genuine evil exists but does not count against God's 
goodness. However, they deny that this freedom has been voluntarily be-
stowed on humanity by God. They believe, instead, that every actual entity 
(including each human soul) simply does possess some power of self-deter-
mination-some "freedom to transcend to some extent the causal power of 
the past. .. in order to decide what [its] reality in that moment will be" (p. 27). 
And, accordingly, since it is always possible for such freedom to be used in 
less than the most appropriate manner, process theists also deny that God 
could unilaterally have produced a world with no evil. 
Griffin next identifies the criteria that will be used to assess these 
theodicies. He acknowledges that analytic philosophers such as Alvin 
Plantinga have successfully demonstrated that "God exists" and "Evil exists" 
are not necessarily inconsistent. But Griffin "cannot see how anyone facing 
the problem of evil as a real problem" will be helped by this type of solution 
(p. 46). What is needed, rather, he believes, is a plausible theodicy-a solu-
tion that is (1) rationally consistent in the sense that it is not "positively 
self-contradictory," (2) experientially adequate in the sense that it is "at least 
minimally consistent with all the relevant facts of experience," and (3) illu-
minating in the sense that it allows "us to see features of the world or our 
experience that we had not seen before" (p. 53). 
With these 'plausibility criteria' in hand, Griffin begins his assessment of 
the two traditional theodicies. [Actually, he utilizes these criteria before he 
formally discusses them.] Griffin quickly dismisses the theodicy proposed by 
traditional all-determining theism. This theodicy, he reminds us, denies the 
reality of genuine evil-evil that is not a necessary component in God's 
perfect plan. But for a theist to deny the reality of genuine evil, Griffin argues, 
requires him or her to acknowledge that such horrendous evils as Auschwitz 
"must finally be regarded as good" (p. 14). And since he believes that this is 
something that no person can actually acknowledge, even if she says she 
does, he concludes that this theodicy fails in that it is inadequate "to the facts 
of experience" (p. 3). 
The only way for the proponent of traditional all-determining theism to 
attempt to avoid this conclusion, we are told, is to try to salvage the concept 
of genuine evil by arguing that "God's complete determination of human acts 
is compatible with their [indeterministic] freedom" (p. 72). But this desperate 
attempt to salvage belief in God, Griffin contends, requires the affirmation 
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of an incoherent concept of omnipotence and therefore is also unable to 
"provide an adequate theodicy" (p. 77). 
Griffin begins his assessment of the traditional free-will theodicy by ac-
knowledging that it is more plausible than that offered by traditional all-de-
termining theism. But he then goes on to discuss the three questions that he 
believes expose the Achilles' heel of a theodicy based on freedom that is 
bestowed on humans by God: (1) If, as it must be granted, the God of free-will 
theism "could have created beings who would be like us in all ways, enjoying 
all the values we can enjoy-intellectual, aesthetic, interpersonal, creative-
except that they would not really be free to act contrary to God's will, and 
thereby would not wreak havoc," then why did this God not do so (p. 83)? 
(2) Why doesn't a God who could unilaterally intervene "occasionally violate 
human freedom for the sake of an overriding good, or to prevent a particularly 
horrible evil" (p. 87)? (3) How can a theodicy built on the contention that 
evil is the result of misguided human choice explain the vast amount of 
natural evil we encounter? 
Griffin does not deny that the traditional free-will theist can offer self-con-
sistent responses to these questions and thus does not deny that it is possible 
for a "rational, sensitive person" to affirm a free-will theodicy (p. 21). But 
the key question to ask of any theodicy, he believes, "is whether that idea of 
God lends itself to an explanation of the world, including its evils, that is 
psychologically convincing to thoughtful men and women" (p. 89). And he 
argues that, while a traditional free-will theodicy may initially appear to have 
some plausibility, the more it is probed, the more unconvincing its explana-
tion for evil will become for thoughtful persons. 
Having thus established, he believes, "that neither form of traditional the-
ism has been successfully defended against the claim that it cannot provide 
a plausible theodicy" (p. 95), Griffin turns his attention to the question of 
whether a process theodicy is adequate. He grants that a number of significant 
questions about this theodicy have been raised: (1) Is it really true that a 
being possessing the properties of the process God could never unilaterally 
control human behavior? (2) Is there really any experiential basis for believ-
ing that all actual entities (including those of which sticks and stones are 
comprised) have some power of self-determination and thus cannot be wholly 
determined by powers beyond themselves? (3) Does the God of process 
theism have equal concern for all creatures or is such a God an elitist? (4) Is 
the God of process theism worthy of worship? But he argues that process 
theism can provide adequate responses to all such challenges and thus con-
cludes that, unlike traditional theism, process theism can offer a theodicy that 
is plausible. 
This book has much to recommend it. For those interested in process the-
ism, it is by far the clearest, most comprehensive presentation of a process 
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theodicy to date. And since most of the book consists of dialogues with 
free-will theists, those interested in the free-will defense (or theodicy) will 
find Griffin's presentation thought-provoking. Moreover, I believe he accom-
plishes part of his overall task. He does, as I see it, demonstrate successfully 
that the process theodicy is no less consistent and comprehensive, and faces 
no greater challenges, than classical theodicies. 
But I do not believe that Griffin successfully demonstrates that process 
theism alone can produce a plausible theodicy. 
First, I do not believe that Griffin does justice to proponents of traditional 
all-determining theism. It is certainly true that such theists must maintain that 
every instance of evil is a state of affairs that God has determined should 
occur. But this does not necessitate, as Griffin implies, that such theists must 
therefore also maintain that all instances of evil-for example, Auschwitz-
are intrinsically desirable state of affairs, even from God's perspective. On 
the contrary, it is perfectly justifiable for the proponent of traditional all-de-
termining theism to maintain that each instance of evil is intrinsically unde-
sirable to both God and humans. And thus it is perfectly justifiable for such 
theists to be saddened by the fact that such events have taken place and hope 
that such events will not occur in the future. What the proponent of traditional 
all-determining theism must acknowledge is only that God has created a 
world containing evil because each occurrence of such evil is necessary to 
produce some very intrinsically desirable state of affairs or to avoid some 
even more intrinsically undesirable state of affairs. And while Griffin may 
well find such a contention farfetched, it seems to me that this type of 
explanation for evil is certainly more defensible-by any standard-than 
either of the explanations Griffin allows proponents of traditional all-deter-
mining theism to choose between: to simply acknowledge that what we as 
humans find to be reprehensible is really intrinsically good or to deny that 
our understanding of evil is self-consistent from a human perspective. 
Second, I believe that Griffin's critique of the plausibility of traditional 
free-will theism contains a serious 'burden of proof' confusion. Griffin is 
certainly justified in telling us why he and others believe that the traditional 
free-will theodicy becomes less plausible-less adequate and illuminating-
the more carefully it is inspected. But to maintain justifiably that free-will 
theism has not. been successfully "defended against the claim that it cannot 
provide a plausible theodicy," Griffin must do more than simply tell us why 
he and others find this theodicy so unsatisfactory. Rather the burden of proof 
is on him to demonstrate that the reasons why he and others find this theodicy 
so implausible are so logically compelling that thoughtful men and women 
who considered these reasons objectively would not be justified in affirming 
its plausibility. That is, the bllrden of proof is on him to demonstrate that, 
given his line of reasoning, thoughtful men and women would not be justified 
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in holding that the traditional free-will theodicy is adequate and illuminating. 
But, as far as I can see, Griffin does not even attempt to address the issue in 
this manner. And hence I see no reason to grant that he has established the 
implausibility of this theodicy. 
Overall, though, as I stated earlier, I believe that most philosophers will 
find this book to be a valuable addition to the ongoing discussion of the 
problem of evil. 
Christian Theism and the Problems of Philosophy, edited by Michael D. 
Beaty. Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1990. Pp. vii, 380. 
$34.95 Cloth; $14.95 Paper. 
TERRY J. CHRISTLIEB, Georgetown, Texas. 
This is the fifth volume in the Library of Religious Philosophy series. It 
contains a reprint of Alvin Plantinga's "Advice to Christian Philosophers" 
(Faith and Philosophy, July, 1984) followed by thirteen essays which show 
how to follow part of that advice. The various authors attempt to resolve 
important philosophical problems by examining them in light of uniquely 
theistic (and often Christian) assumptions. To the extent that the essays are 
successful they not only help with the philosophical problems but also reveal 
the explanatory relevance and usefulness of theistic beliefs. Even when they 
are not so successful, the essays display clearly the quality of contemporary 
Christian philosophy. The proposals contained in the articles are focused and 
readable, and most of all they are creative, repeatedly offering interesting 
new angles on the problems under discussion. 
Excluding "Advice to Christian Philosophers," four essays each are de-
voted to epistemology and ethics, and five concern metaphysics. Four of the 
essays appeared in volume 4, number 4 of Faith and Philosophy (October 
1987) and so may already be familiar to readers of this journal; the other nine 
were written for this volume. The volume also contains a fine introduction 
to the essays by editor Michael D. Beaty. 
The epistemology section contains essays aimed at showing that a theistic 
perspective yields a better understanding of probability and of epistemic 
justification, an essay which explores the compatibility of reliabilism and 
theism, and one which develops a theory of rationality applicable to both 
scientific and religious belief systems. Two of the metaphysics essays are 
concerned with counterfactuals. The first focuses on those with impossible 
antecedents and leads to a proposed extension of "the standard analysis" of 
counterfactuals. The second argues that "natural laws" are grounded in coun-
terfactuals of freedom. The section also contains interesting articles on the 
ground of mathematical objects, the mind/body problem, and free will. The 
